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When the French Left took power in 1981 by winning the 
Presidential election in May and the Parliamentary elections in 
June, they were in a powerful position to implement far-reaching 
changes in the French state and society. It was expected that 
tradtional Left-wing poliicies such as the nationalization of 
banks and some key industries, and increased social welfare, would 
be given priority by the new Government and this was indeed the 
case (1). However, the announcement that a "vast" programme of 
political decentralization would be carried out caused some 
surprise, especially among foreign observers. The French Left had, 
however, swung over to some of the theses.of regionalism in the 
'Sixties despite having been firm Jacobins prior to this (2). 
Furthermore, decentralization was one of the basic themes of the 
110 Propositions of the candidate Mitterrand. There should, there­
fore, have been less surprise than this announcement provoked. In 
any case the political decentralization promised by the Socialists 
was no less significant than their other promised policies since 
it involved a fundamental change in the relations between the 
citizens and the state and of the intermediary bodies between 
them. This proposed change had its foundation in a theory of 
democracy espoused by the Socialists based on the idea of the 




























































































democracy which they conceived as leading to a levelling down and 
dehumanizing of the individual. The new government announced its 
intention of carrying out a radical overhaul of the prefectoral 
system, which had retained its basic features since it was set up 
by Napoleon 1 (3). President Mitterrand went so far as to declare 
that the decentralization reforms would be "la grande affaire du 
septennat".
The legislative basis of the reform programme may be found in 
the law of 2 March 1982, modified and completed by the law of the 
22 April 1982 (4). The main purpose of these laws was to 
democratize local government institutions by substituting an 
elected executive (Conseil général and Conseil régional) for an 
appointed one (the préfet). This would entail a transfer of powers 
(compétences) and a corresponding transfer of resources and 
personnel. Although the reform programme has been only partially 
completed, some critical commentaries have appeared (5). This 
paper is concerned with only one aspect of the reforms, albeit an 
important one: the granting of a Statut Particulier to Corsica. 
Corsica was perceived by the Socialists as having a peculiar set 
of problems not to be found even in the other "ethnic" regions of 
France. This peculiarity derived from the fact of insularity. 
Nevertheless, the island was also seen as being a particular 
instance of a wider problem - the plight of regions and linguistic 




























































































d1essai) for the decentralization reforms as a whole. What was to 
be tested in particular was the functioning of the new decentral­
ized institutions.
There is obviously a certain amount of ambiguity here. How 
can Corsica be used as a test-case for a general phenomenon if it 
is a particular case?(6) The answer to this problem seems to be 
that while the degree of the island's problems differed from that 
of the other regions such as Brittany and the French Basque 
Country (reflected in the higher level of political violence on 
the island), the nature of the problem is the same: how to trans­
form peripheral societies from backward enclaves of economic 
decline and political clientelism to modern democratic societies. 
The attempt to promote this kind of development on Corsica does 
indeed allow us to make some kind of prediction as to the possible 
development of the decentralization programme in the rest of 
France. This paper therefore will first of all examine the back­
ground to the reforms - the problème corse. It will then analyse 
the main legislative texts which form the statut particuler. This 
is followed by an examination of the functioning of the new in­
stitutions to date and an assessment of their possible 
development. However, it should be stressed that this paper is 
mainly an empirical analysis and is therefore largely historical 
and descriptive. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the elements 




























































































the problems of regional and institutional reform, fedaralism and 
unitary states, the problem of ethnic conflict and mobilization, 
etc.
Le problème corse
The "problème corse" is the result of historical, cultural, 
social and political factors which combined in the period follow­
ing the Second World War to produce an explosive situtation (7). 
Previous French governments, such as those of the Giscardian 
period, sought to diminish the seriousness of the problem by 
claiming that there was no problème corse but "des problèmes en 
Corse". This aproach was based on the Jacobin denial that there 
existed such a thing as an organic Corsican entity (such as an 
"ethnie", "nation" or "peuple"), as the regionalists claimed, and 
the corollary was that there are no Corsicans but "des Français 
qui habitent en Corse". As we shall see, this question of identity 
is central to the Corsican problem and each side - the Jacobin and 
the regionalist - emphasized one aspect of the complex Corsican 
identity. However, the governmental approach mentioned here was 
meant principally to obfuscate the problem rather than elucidate 
it. What it failed to recognize was the existence of one problem 




























































































problem presupposed a recognition of this global aspect. This 
section will lay bare the different elements of the problem in 
order to grasp its totality.
(i) The cultural element: a dual identity
Culture is here used in the sense of a set of practices, from 
the manner of preparing food to linguistic expressions, that give 
to any social group a set of characteristics marking it off from 
other groups. Cultural identity is the self-consciousness of that 
group with regard to its own culture. The complexity of the 
Corsican identity derives from the peculiar historical and 
geographical circumstances of the island. Corsica became French in 
1768/9 after an ephemeral period of independence when Pascal Paoli 
attempted to set up a democratic liberal Republic (8). Since then, 
most Corsicans have remained loyal to France, principally because 
of the benefits they derived from belonging to a great power. The 
island, however, had been a colony of Genoa for several centuries 
prior to its annexation by France. It was this participation in 
what may be called "Italianate" civilization over a period of 
several centuries that gave to Corsica its particular social and 
linguistic traditions and its ancient culture, which are closer to 




























































































The survival of this ancient culture may be explained by 
geographical factors. Corsica is only 80kms from Italy but 180kms 
from France. Its inaccessible mountainous interior contained a 
population which lived clustered in small villages, most of which 
were isolated from each other by impassable mountain ridges. 
Because of. this external isolation and internal inaccessiblity, 
communication between France and the island was extremely dif­
ficult, with the result that the traditional "Italianate" society 
and culture survived after the annexation by France much longer 
than was the case for other French regions which became assimi­
lated by a process of cultural osmosis because of geographical 
proximity(9). Italian remained the written (if not official) 
language of the Corsican elites until well into the second half of 
the nineteenth century. The last Corsican poet to express himself 
in Italian (as well as Corsican and French) died in Florence in 
the 1930"s (10). The illiterate peasantry, as well as the educated 
middle classes, continued to speak the Corsican dialect which is, 
in reality, a dialect of Italian (11).
The French language began to become dominant over Italian 
only during the Second Empire. Its progress accelerated as the 
system of universal education instituted by the Third Republic 
began to have effect and eventually Italian was completely dis­
placed by French. Nevertheless, the Corsican dialect continued to 




























































































that over 70 per cent of the Corsican population over the age of 
thirty either understand or speak it (12). The result of this 
situation has been the creation of a dual identity. Many Corsicans 
are bilingual and bicultural, possessing an ancient "Italianate" 
identity upon which has been superimposed a French one. This 
duality is reinforced by the persistence of social customs which 
emphasized the "difference" of Corsicans from other French people: 
the role of the family, kinship relations, marriage ceremonies, 
etc which have been studied by anthropologists. However, the 
duality extends to every level of society. French political and 
administrative institions have been taken over and imbued with a 
spirit quite different from the political philosophy which un­
derlies the modern state in its democratic form, as we shall see
below. This, in turn, feeds the sentiment of "being different " on
the part of Corsicans and on the part of their French ad-
ministrators, with, finally, the former living up to the
expectations of the latter. This duality or complexity of the 
Corsican identity contains within itself the seeds of conflict 
which, nevertheless, would not sprout until recent years when the 
submerged (Italianate) dimension resurfaced. This first element of 




























































































(ii) The structural element; economic, societal and political 
relationships
The survival of an ancient culture on which French traditions 
were imposed was the result of Corsica's geographical position and 
topographical structures. The same factors influenced the island's 
development on the economic, social and political levels. It was 
only slowly that economic modernization occured, mainly as a 
result of efforts by the French state. Throughout the 19th cen­
tury, there took place a modernization and diversification of 
agriculture and some industrial progress, including the appearance 
of some heavy industry (13). This, however, was partial and 
geographically uneven and the island's economic structures were 
marked by the preponderance of an archaic pastoralism and anti­
quated agricultural techniques, some of which had not changed 
since neolithic times. The more progressive sectors never suc­
ceeded in becoming dominant over the latter, and finally collapsed 
at the end of the 19th century under the impact of the ascending 
monopoly capitalism (14). By the turn of the century, practically 
no industry remained and the agriculturally progressive regions 




























































































The social relationships on the island reflected this type of 
economy and the state of its development. The basis of social life 
was the extended family and the village. Village life was based, 
not on a romantic communistic concept of society, but on the 
struggle for scarce resources (15). In this struggle, villages 
were divided among themselves as different "parties" struggled for 
control of the mechanisms and institutions (mainly the mairies) by 
which these resources were distributed. Thus Corsican society took 
the form of villages and regions living in autarchic isolation 
(16) deeply divided among themselves. The basic unit was the 
family, but groups of families were "represented" by the heads of 
more powerful families (the capu di partitu) in an ascending 
pyramidal structure. This structure is what is known in 
Corsican/Italian as the partitu and in French as the clan. A 
Corsican's primary loyalty traditionally was to his family and the 
wider clan of which it was a part rather than to the state. The 
latter was seen chiefly as a means of promoting the clan's 
interests. This loyalty was recompensed by a system of favours and 
menus services rendus. The consequence of this divided structure 
of society was the omnipresence of violence and conflict. From the 
level of the village to Corsican society as a whole, Corsicans 
were divided into rival groups and this rivalry frequently led to 
blood feuds and the vendetta. It is clear that far from being the 
cosy "democratic" paradise which some Corsican nationalists are 



























































































vendetta and banditry. Furthermore, there existed very little 
freedom, in its modern individualistic sense of freedom from, as 
the village structure was as much a system of mutual spying as of 
mutual solidarity (18).
The most striking feature of Corsican political development 
is the slowness with which the modern state imposed itself on this 
primitive society. If we accept the Weberian notion of the modern 
state as that institution which has the monopoly of legitimate 
violence, then Corsica, under French rule, cannot be described as 
participating fully in the modern state. Throughout the 19th 
century, this legitimacy of the state was challenged in a de facto 
fashion by the fact that almost everyone carried arms and the 
local magistrates and gendarmerie were powerless to stop them. The 
institutions of the state, such as the judiciary and local govern­
ment institutions, were invested by the clans who perverted them 
into organs of patronage and corruption. As remarked above, they 
existed, in the eyes of Corsicans, principally to serve the inter­
ests of the clan. The contemporary system may be said to have been 
set up in the early years of the Third Republic when Corsican 
political life simply became the ancient struggle of clan rivalry 
fought out in the arena of Republican institutions with an almost 
complete disregard for Republican legality. "Politics", in the 
sense of the political activity of the modern state based on the 




























































































island. The clan leaders adopted the political etiquettes of the 
French parties, but in practice ignored their ideological content 
and continued to behave as Corsican partiti. There was practically 
no difference in the political and social practices of the rival 
clans (19) .
The economic, social and political backwardness of Corsican 
society had consequences for the nature of the relationship be­
tween the island and the French state. The principal consequence 
in human terms was the massive emigration from the island to the 
French mainland and colonies. This had been a trickle throughout 
the 19th century but became a flood toward its end (20). This was 
exacerbated by the catastrophe of the First World War, when 
Corsica, like most of rural France, paid a •heavy price - between 
twenty and thirty thousand able-bodied men killed or wounded (21). 
This in turn was a mortal blow to the already fragile economy and 
in this situation the clans strengthened their position as 
mediators between the local society and the state. This mediation 
took the form of patronage in procuring positions for their 
clients in the Civil Service, Police, Army and colonies, and 
pensions and favours for those who remained on the island. This 
parasitic clan system was, therefore, both a symptom and a cause 
of the Corsican problem. It reflected the necessity Corsicans 
faced of ensuring some kind of economic and social survival - what 




























































































time it blocked any hope of development since the power of the 
clans was based on the dire economic deprivation of the majority 
of Corsicans.
These, then, are the essential features of Corsican society 
and its relations with the French state which have survived up to 
the period following the Second World War and, indeed, until 
today. What is remarkable about the system is, indeed, its 
capacity for survival by adapting to any set of circumstances 
whether a change of regime or an economic or political crisis. The 
constant is that the clan preserves its power by investing the new 
institutions or by quickly coming to terms with the new masters in 
Paris. For most of this period, Corsicans did not react against 
the French state because of these problems. There were 
regionalist, autonomist and nationalist movements at the turn of 
the century and in the interwar period (23). These, however, seem 
to have been a small minority of Corsican intellectuals. On the 
contrary most Corsicans seem to have had highly positive feelings 
in favour of the French state since it was the state, via the 
intermediation of the clans, that was the source of their material 
and social security. Indeed, most Corsicans were proud of their 
Frenchness, particularly when they compared their lot with their 
neighbours - the despised "Lucchesi” (a general term for all 
Italians) who came from the peninsula and the islands to perform 




























































































words, it was the French dimension of their identity that was 
heightened by these structural elements. A conflict would occur 
only with the introduction of a new element and to this we now 
turn.
(iii) The catalytic element: the rapid "development" of post-war 
Corsica
Corsica was not only the first, but the only French 
département to liberate itself from German and Italian occupation. 
The rejection of Fascist irredentism, strengthened during the 
Occupation by Italian soldiers and Blackshirts, and the conscious­
ness of being the first Frenchmen to liberate themselves, led 
Corsicans to think of themselves as "super-Français"(24). While 
Corsicans retained their ancient culture, as we have seen, it was 
the French dimension that was emphasized during this period. Even 
more so than in the past, to be Corsican meant to be French, and 
the awareness of any Italianate dimension was violently 
suppressed.
This consciousness of being French, however, had in it the 
seeds of conflict. By the end of the war, the island seemed to be 
on the point of collapse. The fighting that had accompanied 




























































































infrastructure. Furthermore, the basic human fabric of the island 
community was dangerously threatened by the continuing high rate 
of emigration. Despite the promises of a golden age that many 
thought would arrive with freedom from Nazi and Fascist 
Occupation, the government seemed to drag its heels on the ques­
tion of providing aid to the island (25). Corsicans began, 
therefore, to ask the question: if we are French, as we have 
proved by our actions, why do we not participate in the benefits 
of belonging to France? This sense of frustration was heightened 
as reconstruction went ahead on the French mainland. In other 
words, the strong identification with France led to a sense of 
relative deprivation.
The seriousness of the situtation alarmed even the tradi­
tional local politicians, who realized that decline had gone too 
far and that this threatened their power base and legitimacy (26). 
This legitimacy was based on their ability to deliver the goods 
and, in a sense, to defend the interests of the islanders. If the 
very island community was endangered to the point of near extinc­
tion, they could hardly be said to be doing so. It was at this 
point, in the early fifties, that the economic regionalization 
programmes of the Fourth Republic coincided with the 
"protoregionalism" of the local elites within the regions to 
produce the Plans d'action régionale (PAR) (27). The PAR for




























































































between technocrats of the Civil Service, the préfet for Corsica, 
and some local politicians and businessmen(28). The motor of the 
island's economic recovery was to be tourism, with agricultural 
development taking a secondary place as a corollary of tourism* 
The Balearic Isles were chosen as the model for Corsica. The 
economic -ideology underlying the PAR was a neo-functionalist 
integrationism prevalent in influential "European" circles at the 
time. The state would provide the economic infrastructure - roads, 
electricity and water supplies, buildings, etc. - which would then 
be exploited by private enterprise. Further development would then 
occur by an "effet multiplicateur" (the phrase used in the wording 
of the law). Two semi-state bodies (sociétés d'économie mixte) 
were set up to implement these policies : SETCO (société 
d'équipment touristique de la Corse) and SOMIVAC (société de la 
mise en valeur agricole de la Corse). The local politicians co­
operated fully with this programme and the two main clan leaders 
François Giaccobi and Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra sat in the conseil 
d 1 administration of the two bodies. However, those appointed to 
run them came from outside Corsica, and were mainly reclassified 
civil servants from Tunisia and Morocco . Thus, the clan leaders 
found themselves in an equivocal position. On the one hand, they 
tried to bolster their legitimacy by claiming credit for the new 
development programme. On the other hand, they lost real control 
over the new development bodies. This equivocal situation may have 




























































































they could throw responsibility onto the administrators. In fact, 
they did just this.
The Corsican PAR produced some spectacular results. The 
number of tourists arriving on the island rocketed. A modern, 
industrialized type of agriculture was introduced and developed by 
pieds noirs repatriates from Algeria who were given large amounts 
of land on Corsica's Oriental Plain at cheap prices. However, this 
rapid development of some sectors of the Corsican economy 
threatened to accelerate the break-up of the traditional society 
and excluded large numbers of Corsicans, such as small hoteliers, 
peasants over whom the pieds noirs were given priority, shop­
keepers and business-men outside of the areas zoned for expansion. 
This is what we have called the catalytic element since it was 
directly responsible for sparking off the potential conflict of 
the cultural element and led to a radical questioning of the 
traditional structures within Corsican society and between it and 
the state. It is this combination which produced the last element 
of the problem and to this we now turn.
(iv) The element of alienation
We have described the relationship between Corsica and France 




























































































"representatives" between the local society and the state. This 
system was under the control of the clans but excluded others. In 
the period following the Second World War, those excluded were 
principally the Communists, the old-style regionalists mentioned 
above who were tainted with Vichyism or collaboration with the 
Fascist Occupation, some Corsicans of the Diaspora (such as the 
large Corsican population of Marseilles led by Bastien Leccia),and 
Corsican students in Marseilles, Aix and Paris. The first two 
groups were excluded by a political decision, the latter two by 
geographical and cultural distance. It was the Communist party in 
Corsica which, in 1959, took the initiative to create the 
Mouvement du 29 Novembre, (Mdu29N) whose leadership was made up 
principally of these excluded groups of Corsican society (29). The 
movement put forward a simple set of demands (a reform of the 
island's fiscal statute, the reduction of freight charges between 
Corsica and the mainland, a protest against the suppression of the 
island's railway system), and set out to mobilize the population 
around them. The strategy of the movement was to put pressure on 
the local politicians by questioning their legitimacy and in this 
way to influence the system of mediation. Even though they did ot 
describe themselves as "regionalist", we wish to call them 
moderate regionalist. They are regionalist in the sense described 
above (footnote 27). They are moderate in that they did not ques­




























































































The moderate regionalists did have a certain amount of 
success in mobilizing the local population and influencing their 
politicians. This they did by creating local committees all over 
Corsica, organizing mass meetings to voice their grievances, 
holding demonstrations and marches and calling for general strikes 
(isula morta) which were well observed. One of their principal 
arguments was that the local politicians failed to protect the 
island's interests and in this way they struck at the heart of 
their legitimacy.
However, the heterogeneous nature of the movement, containing 
a majority who did not question the traditional institutions of 
the départements and communes, prevented it from attacking the 
system as such. Their aim was rather to clean up the system by 
subsituting a different form of political behaviour for the old 
type of clientelism. In the end, the clans managed to infiltrate 
the movement and put their men into the key positions of 
leadership. This, in turn, led to a dilution of its demands and 
destroyed its effectiveness as a protest group. This led to a 
split in 1963 between, on the one hand, the radical regionalists, 
including the old-style regionalists and the young intelligentsia 
on the mainland, and, on the other, those parties of the French 
Left (Communists and Socialists) who at this point came to terms 




























































































its name to the CAPCO (Comité d'action et de promotion de la 
Corse) and then faded from the scene of Corsican politics.
The radical regionalists are so called because it was they 
who began to promote the non-French (Corsican/Italian) side of 
their identity, although they were at pains to play down any 
Italian connection given the unfortunate experience of the 
Occupation. This ethnic "otherness" became the basis of an ideol­
ogy (which they called at first "regionalism" and then 
"autonomism") which put into question the political, administra­
tive and economic relations between the island and France. There 
were two main tendencies among the radical regionalists. On the 
one hand, there were the old-style regionalists, whose sympathies 
lay on the right of the political spectrum (for example, with 
Maréchal Pétain or with Poujade) some of whom had collaborated 
with Vichy or the Italians. This tendency was known as the CEDIC 
(Comité d'études et de développement des intérêts corses), whose 
chief ideologue was Paul-Marc Seta, assisted by Max Simeoni, then 
a young medical student. This tendency became known as ARC (Action 
régionaliste corse) and is represented today, albeit with an 
apparently more "progressive" political philoshopy, by the UPC 
(Unione di u Populu Corsu) of Edmond Simeoni, brother of Max. 
Their demand was based on the federalist idea that there existed 
a Corsican "ethnie" (or, later, "peuple") which had a legal right 




























































































existed to destroy such ethnies and create an agglomeration of 
atomised individuals. Such protection could be assured only by 
appropriate administrative structures. The model chosen was the 
statutes of internal autonomy granted by the Italian state to 
Sicily and Sardinia. The other tendency was the FRC (Front 
regionaliste corse), whose principal leaders were Charles Santoni 
and Dominique Alfonsi. The FRC may be described as an overhauled 
version of old-style regionalism. The difference lay in the their
use of Marxist terminology and concepts. This gave them an ap-
|
parent progressiveness which their rivals lacked. The FRC thought 
of Corsica as a "nation" oppressed by an imperialist power, the 
French state, in the same way that other colonies were oppressed 
by imperialism. In other words, they began to apply to Corsica the 
theory of internal colonialism which had been developed by the 
Occitan militant and intellectual Robert Lafont (30). They too 
demanded radical changes in the relations between Corsica and 
France but proposed a process of change in the context of a wider 
socialist transformation of French society.
There were differences too in political strategy and support 
base. The right-wing radical regionalists were more populist and 
wished to continue the tactics of the Mdu29N of mobilization of 
the population. However, they were more willing to use the elec­
toral process to do so. This they soon abandoned given the corrupt 




























































































intrinsically biased in favour of the clans. The support base of 
this tendency was the small farmers around the Oriental Plain, 
disgruntled by the favour shown to the pieds noirs, small 
businessmen and shopkeepers, and some intellectuals such as 
school-teachers. In other words, the support base of Right-wing 
radical regionalism resembles that of the Poujadiste mouvement. 
The FRC, on the other hand, tended to be confined to the young 
intellectuals living on the French mainland, although Dominique 
Alfonsi did return to Ajaccio in the early sixties to begin a 
movement of his own. The group did not seek to mobilize the 
population but provided the growing regionalist movement with the 
ideology we have outlined above (31). Both groups came together 
for a few months in the sixties, but the ideological split between 
Left and Right was too great and they went their separate ways. 
The UPC still exists under that name, still dominated by Edmond 
Simeoni (who has nevertheless retired from active leadership 
because of health problems). The FRC tendency has also survived 
but under different names. Its present representative is perhaps 
the PPC (Partitu Populare Corsu) whose leader is Dominique 
Alfonsi. Charles Santoni and some of his friends joined the 
Socialist Party in the 1970's but left in 1982 in disagreement 





























































































We have described the regionalist groups as being excluded to 
one degree or other from the system of mediation that passed for 
the island's political life. The logical extreme of exclusion is 
to "prendre le rnaquis" as the old bandits and the Resistants 
against Fascism had done. To take to the rnaquis means to take up 
arms against the state and this has occurred in Corsica from the 
early sixties when the first bombings took place against the 
installations of the SOMIVAC on the Oriental Plain, mainly in the 
Fiumorbo region. Several armed groups made their appearance carry­
ing out such attacks. In 1976, several of these groups came 
together to form the FLNC (Front de Liberation nationale de la 
Corse), whose aim is to set up an independent Corsican Republic. 
This tendency, dedicated to the violent overthrow of French rule 
in Corsica, developed out of radical regionalism and may be called 
separatist nationalism. The relations between it and radical 
regionalism are equivocal. The latter condemns violence, but many 
of those who have taken up arms have served their political ap­
prenticeship in the UPC and FRC. Furthermore, the UPC has, on 
occasion, taken up arms itself, although in a public manner (as 
opposed to the clandestine manner of the FLNC), as during the 
events of Aleria in 1976 (32). In any case, the FLNC, while 
remaining a tiny minority of the island's population, were 
nevertheless able to generate sufficient violence and counter­
violence to create widespread public unease. They also became a 




























































































population, with the consequent possibility of massive recruitment 
into their ranks. This tendency has carried to its logical conclu­
sion what was implicit or ambiquous in the ideological position of 
radical regionalism: the rejection of any French dimension to 
their identity.
These, then, are the principal features of the Corsican 
problem. The rapid and unbalanced development programme of the 
1960's, delivered a shock to the traditional relationships of a 
society that had survived, albeit in a moribund form, almost 
unchanged. This brutal change provoked various political responses 
in .ideology and practice from different sections of Corsican 
society. The nature of this response, from moderate regionalism to 
separatist nationalism, may be related to the degree of participa­
tion in, or exclusion from, the system of mediation between the 
local society and the state. As the process of radicalization 
developed, there was a dislocation of the different elements of 
the Corsican identity as the radicals exploited its ambiquity and 
attacked the French dimension. Finally, this led to a widespread 
critique of the structural relations between Corsica and France. 
Some radical regionalists wished simply for a statute of autonomy 
within France by which the Corsican "ethnie" could have control 
over its own affairs. Others saw the problem as demanding a 
"national liberation" by which the colony of Corsica would throw 




























































































regionalists turned to the past to find the Corsican "nation" and 
to legitimize their present struggle. Most found it in the Paolian 
Republic and this became a mobilizing myth to counter the Jacobin 
myth of the French nation. The net result in political terms was 
endemic violence, widespread public unease, and the possibility of 
an even more massive alienation of Corsican youth.
Governmental responses
Governmental policy towards protest movements in France has 
been carried out by "fits and starts". A situation is allowed to 
build up in which positions on both sides harden and then, sud­
denly, the government concedes some demands but not others. This 
has the effect of further radicalizing the protest movement. This, 
in effect, is how the governments of the Fifth Republic have 
responded to the Corsican problem. Most of the demands of the 
moderate regionalists were eventually met, but too late to prevent 
the radical regionalists occupying the centre of the stage. Under 
Giscard d'Estaing, governmental policy toward Corsica, where the 
radical regionalists were now making the headlines, was a mixture 
of the carrot and the stick. The carrot was the continued massive 
subsidization of the island, which only reinforced the structural 
elements of the problem since the subsidies were distributed in a 
clientelistic manner. The stick was the equally massive use of 




























































































Algerian crisis to deal with subversives. By the time of the 1981 
elections, many Corsicans were extremely demoralized and there was 
widespread fear that, in the event of a Giscardian victory, 
repression would be stepped up, followed by a corresponding in­
crease in political violence (33).
The Socialists and Corsica: the Statut Particulier
Fortunately for Corsica, it was not Giscard but Mitterrand 
who won the Presidential election of May 1981. After the Socialist 
victory in the June parliamentary elections, the new Left-wing 
government decided to turn its attention to the probleme corse. 
This was part of a general programme of reforms which included 
political decentralization as a means of introducing a greater 
degree of democracy into local government as well as meeting some 
of the demands of linguistic and cultural minorities for a new 
deal from the French state, traditionally backward in this area.
Those who had especial responsibility for the island had an 
intimate knowledge of the situation. Gaston Defferre who, as 
Minister of the Interior and Decentralization had the task of 
drawing up and implementating the decentralization laws, was also 




























































































outside of Corsica. His right-hand man in Marseilles was Bastien 
Leccia, a Socialist deputy of Corsican origin who, as noted above, 
was one of the leaders of the Mouvement du 29 Novembre. 
Furthermore, in the 1970's there took place a movement of trans- 
fuges from the regionalists to the Socialists, including, as we 
have seen, Charles Santoni. These Corsican Socialists were respon­
sible, in 1977, for putting together a bill for the National 
Assembly which would have given to Corsica a Statut Particulier 
which was very close to the statute of autonomy demanded by the 
radical regionalists (34).
Not surprisingly, the bill did not get far in an Assembly 
dominated by the Right. Nevertheless, it provided the inspiration 
for the Socialist project of 1982. The new government was deter­
mined to make a radical break with the policies of the Right-wing 
governments of the past and decided that, in the case of Corsica, 
the way to do so was by a statut particulier. In fact, divisions 
within the PS itself and limitations imposed by the Conseil con­
stitutionnel led to a toning down of the 1982 version compared 
with that of 1977 (35). The principal difference between the two 
is that, whereas in the original version, decisions of the 
Corsican Assembly (elected by direct universal suffrage) would 
have been binding on the national government, in the updated 
version, the Assembly would only have a consultative role. In 




























































































federalist system and a reaffirmation that political sovereignty 
should remain totally with the central government. Nevertheless, 
the Socialist project does represent a more radical form of 
political decentralization compared with the regionalization 
attempts of their predecessors, if only in that the functioning of 
local administrative institutions, because of election by univer­
sal suffrage, is now to be controlled by the local populations. 
Furthermore, in the Corsican case, an examination of the legisla­
tive texts,and the new institutions which they establish, reveals 
a largely coherent and comprehensive attempt to deal with most of 
the elements that have been outlined in the first section of this 
paper .
The Socialists had to strike a balance between two opposed 
ideologies and political groupings. On the one hand, there were 
those who had been alienated from the political system - the 
regionalists of various kinds. On the other, there were those, 
perhaps the majority of Corsicans, who feared that any move toward 
political decentralization would lead to the separation of Corsica 
from France. Many local politicians also feared the consequences 
of a decentralization which forced political responsibility on 
them, accustomed as they were to the irresponsibility of patron- 
client relationships made possible by massive subsidization from 
the state. The Socialist Party, having adopted regionalist theses 




























































































group. At the same time, they knew they could not afford to 
alienate the latter.
The statut particulier for Corsica reflects this desire to 
reconcile these opposing tendencies, but also represents a wish to 
change the- system of irresponsibility of local politicians by 
introducing a greater measure of local democracy. For the 
Jacobins, there is the reassurance that the reforms are not in­
tended to encourage any move toward federalism. For the 
regionalists, there is the setting up of a Regional Assembly, 
elected by direct universal suffrage, which would allow the local 
population greater control over their political, social, economic 
and cultural affairs.
In practice, however, the Statute leans more toward the 
regionalists than toward the traditional Jacobins (as opposed to 
the new Jacobins of the PS). First of all, there is the recogni­
tion that Corsica is a special entity with characteristics that 
mark it off from the rest of France:
L'organisation de la région de Corse tient compte des 
spécificités de cette région résultant, notamment, de sa 




























































































An entire section (Titre 1er) of the law of July 1982 dealt with 
the "identité culturelle de la Corse" (36). While the laws did not 
explicitly recognize the existence of an "ethnie corse" or a 
"peuple corse", a recognition long demanded by the radical 
regionalists as the legal basis for policy-making, the emphasis on 
Corsica's -specificity was at least a step in the direction of such 
a recognition. On a visit to the island in 1983, President 
Mitterrand himself used the phrase "le peuple corse", which seems 
to confirm this (37). This point may seem trivial to outsiders, 
but it was central to the demands of the radical regionalists, who 
had adopted the federalist idea that the legal basis of centre- 
periphery relations should be that of a contract between a legal 
person (the "ethnie" or "peuple") and the state drawn up by the 
two partners as equals. In fact, the Socialists have not abandoned 
the Jacobin concept of the state as the primary and final locus of 
political sovereignty, in opposition to this federalist concept. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the awareness of the regionalists' 
position, there has been a notable shift from the period when 
French governments merely recognized "des Français qui habitent en 
Corse" to a recognition that Corsicans might at least have a dual 
identity and that Corsican society has a specific character.
The institutions created by the statut particulier may also 
be seen as a concession to the radical regionalists, even if, as 




























































































hoped for. The most important of these institutions is the 
Corsican Assembly, consisting of sixty-one members elected by 
direct universal suffrage by proportional representation (38). The 
executive of the region is no longer the préfet régional, who 
becomes instead the commissaire de la République, but the 
President of the Assembly and his bureau of vice-Presidents. This 
may be seen as a response to the demand by regionalists for 
greater political control over the regional institutions. At the 
same time, the specificity of Corsica is recognized by giving it 
an Assemblée while the other regions will simply have Conseils. 
The difference lies in more than the name as the Assembly will 
have greater powers than the Conseils. Its basic function is to 
administer the economic, cultural and social affairs of the 
regions (39). It will do this principally by deciding the 
priorities of that portion of the national budget allotted to 
Corsica and then entering into a contract with the state on the 
basis of this decision. While Corsicans have in this way, been 
given a greater control over how their island is administered 
(thanks to the system of election by universal suffrage), politi­
cal sovereignty remains with the government since the latter may 
veto any proposal that the Assembly puts forward. The only binding 
power the Assembly has on the government is to stop any proposed 
legislation of the latter which affects the region in order that 
the advice of the region may be given. In the end, however, the 




























































































the Assembly's powers may be seen as a result of that continuing 
Jacobinism of which we have spoken above (40).
Other institutions created by the statut particulier have the 
function of assisting the Assembly in its task of administering 
the region. These include two consultative councils: the conseil 
économique et social and the conseil de la culture, de l'éducation 
et du cadre de vie, the latter being unique to Corsica. The mem­
bers of these councils are appointed in a proportion that should 
reflect the importance of the forces vives of the region 
(economic, social and cultural interest groups).
This desire to include a wide cross-section of the local 
population (and not simply local notables) may be seen as follow­
ing the basic logic of the Socialists' reforms: the attempt to 
promote greater democracy at the local level. An important aspect 
of this is the inclusion of those who had been alienated in 
various ways from the mainstream of Corsican political and social 
life as outlined above. These include cultural activists who felt 
the Corsican culture had been degraded by official neglect and 
even hostility, political actors who felt they could not par­
ticipate in the existing political system over which they could 
exercize little control, and economic groups such as trade unions 
and peasant groups who were excluded by pre-existing regional 




























































































According to the regionalist theory developed by the Left, 
democracy would be promoted only by the inclusion of these forces 
vives into the political system and the processes of decision­
making and implementation. Only in this way could the structural 
problem be solved (the corrupt system of patron-client relation­
ships and- economic dependency). This approach is also evident in 
the creation of bodies known as the Offices (economic development 
agencies). Corsicans had long complained that the SOMIVAC and the 
SETCO were controlled by non-Corsicans in the interests of groups 
foreign to the island. The establishment of the Offices is meant 
to rectify this situation by placing the development agencies 
under the control of the Regional Assembly and therefore of the 
local population.
These development agencies are the Office d1Equipment 
hydraulique and the Office du Développment agricole et rural, 
which replace the SOMIVAC. Both Offices have a single Conseil 
d 'administration and Art. 16 (41) stipulates that professional 
farmers' organizations should have the majority of seats on it. 
Art.15 states that the Office du Développement agricole et rural 
must submit its budget proposals to the Regional Assembly, which 
may then modify them. In this way, it is hoped to avoid the abuses 
that had marked the SOMIVAC operations. Greater control over 
transport is provided by an Office des Transports, by means of




























































































Transports est substitué à l'Etat") the responsibility for nego­
tiating contracts with the maritime companies,, These contracts 
would define "les tarifs» les conditions d'exécution» et la 
qualité de service ainsi que leurs modalités de contrôle"(42) „ 
The Presidents of the three Offices are chosen by a vote of the 
Regional Assembly.
The Socialists wished in this way to promote a type of 
development which differs from that of the PAR of 1957. It is now 
agriculture that occupys the central place instead of tourism. 
However, the latter is not neglected and an Agence régionale de 
Tourisme has also been created. In fact, there is a concern to 
promote a harmonious economic development and the decentralization 
laws, as well as the Statut Particulier> have created several 
bodies to bring this about. These include the Comité de 
Coordination pour le développement de la Corse» presided by the 
Prime Minister (art. 8); a group composed of mayors to draw up a 
Schéma d1Aménagement de la Corse (art. 9); a Commission mixte sur 
11 emploi (art. 21), the presidency of which is "alternativement 
assurée par un représentant de l'Etat et par un représentant de la 
Région de Corse"; a Comité régional de Prêts; and a Comité 
régional de la Communication audiovisuelle (art. 5) (43). Besides 
these bodies specific to Corsica, the region will receive others 




























































































fields of education, culture and environment, housing and profes­
sional training (loi du 7 janvier, 1983).
There is also to be a transfer of resources and personnel, an 
administrative déconcentration corresponding to this political 
decnetralization. All field services of the state will be grouped 
under the direct control of the Regional Prefect, who will then 
make them available to the executive of the Regional Assembly 
(44) .
In summary, then, it may be argued that the Socialist Statut 
Particulier is a comprehensive attempt to deal with several ele­
ments of the problème corse. By recognizing and promoting the two 
dimensions of the Corsican identity, an attempt has been made to 
reconcile and harmonize both of them. The structural element is 
met by setting up bodies whose function is to promote a more sane 
and balanced economic and social development. By democratizing the 
regional bodies, it is hoped to change the traditional political 
irresponsibility of the local politicians by thrusting respon­
sibility upon them. At the same time, it is hoped that the input 
of the forces vives of the region will accelerate this process of 
modernization. Democratization would also have the effect of 
reducing the degree of exclusion and alienation. Finally, these 
measures are designed to counteract the catalytic element, as a 




























































































vives and the reformed local politicians. At least this is the 
theory? What about the practice? To this we now turn.
The settin-g up and functioning of the new institutions
The were two main sources from which possible resistance to 
the reforms would come: from the local politicians and from within 
the Civil Service (45). To overcome this possible resistance, the 
government chose the tactic of speed (46). The main legislative 
texts had become law by mid-1982 and the elections to the Corsican 
Assembly were to be held in August of the same year. This had the 
advantage of catching the Opposition (the traditional French 
Right), still in disarray and demoralized, on the hop, while the 
government benefitted from the prestige of its recent victory. On 
the other hand, it entailed the risk of a hasty, ill-prepared 
implementation of one of the basic planks of the Socialist 
programme.
In practice, the reforms have been implemented more smoothly 
than might have been expected . The FLNC had called a cease-fire 




























































































to see the new government's response to the Corsican problem. 
Although they finally denounced the government's plans as a "new 
form of colonialism", and their political counterpart the 
Muvimentu corsu di Autodeterminazione (MCA) boycotted the Assembly 
elections in August, the cease-fire nevertheless held until then. 
Furthermore-, the type of proportional representation adopted, with 
only 1.6 per cent of the vote being necessary to obtain at least 
one seat, enticed the UPC (autonomists) and PPC (nationalists) to 
present lists. Thus, the strategy of drawing back into the 
mainstream of political life those excluded or alienated from it, 
seemed to be working (except on the FLNC and MCA). Since the 
Regional Assembly is the key institution of the reform, it was 
necessary that it should be marked from the start as the 
legitimate expression of the political complexion of the Corsican 
people. For this reason, a special Commission was set up, to 
examine and purge the island's electoral registers, notorious for 
their inflated character (47). This measure was also designed to 
attract the autonomists and nationalists who had hitherto refused 
to contest elections on the grounds of their corrupt 
character(48).
The elections were marked by a high turn-out (68.84 per cent 
of registered voters cast their votes - 138,412 out of 201,166) 
(49). Surprisingly for Corsica, there were no claims of electoral 




























































































of the elections. Gaston Defferre later remarked that "les 
élections se sont déroulées dans le calme et la dignité. Pour la 
première fois depuis longtemps, aucune contestation n'a accompagné 
la proclamation des résultats. L'élection de votre Assemblée n'est 
entachée d'aucun soupçon ..." (50). This view was later reiterated 
by President Mitterrand himself during a visit to the island: 
"Vous avez battu les records de participation, sans aucun conten­
tieux électoral. Voici donc une Assemblée incontestable dans sa 
réalité démocratique" (51).
The actual results of the election, however, brought only 
mixed comfort to the government. First of all, there was a multi­
plicity of lists - 17 lists each containing 61 candidates, or 1037 
candidates for 61 seats in an electorate of roughly 200,000 
registered voters - with each major political formation, including 
the Communist Party, facing a dissident list. The Socialists 
themselves were challenged by a list led by Charles Santoni, who 
had been expelled from the party because of disagreement over the 
implementation of the Statut Particulier. Such a multiiplicity, 
reminiscent of the politics of the Fourth Republic, held out the 
prospect of an unstable Assembly, since the formation of a 
majority would be more difficult. At first, however, the govern­
ment were more concerned that their strategy of wooing the 
autonomists paid off. The UPC had indeed won 7 seats and 10.6 per 





























































































have enough seats to form a majority, the UPC found itself in a 
mediating position. It decided to ally itself with the Left and 
this enabled a majority to vote for a President, Prosper Alfonsi 
of the MRG, who then formed the executive (52). The internal 
Commissions were set up, and so the Assembly got under way (53). 
The first phase of the reform passed off, therefore, successfully.
At this point, however, the hasty and ill-prepared nature of 
the reform began to have its effect and threatened to damage the 
credibility of the new institutions. The building that housed the 
Assembly was inadequate, there was insuffient funding for the 
Assemly's administration, complaints were heard that the govern­
ment did not take its own brainchild sufficiently seriously, etc. 
Furthermore, the FLNC, unimpressed by the reforms, relaunched its 
campaign of violence and even stepped it up, causing public unease 
(54). The diminishing credibility of the Assembly and its in­
ability to deal with the violence, combined with the growing 
public unease, prompted the government to act. The Prime Minister, 
Pierre Mauroy, setn a letter reaffirming government support for 
the reforms (55). In June 1983, President Mitterrand himself paid 
a solemn visit to the island to bolster the prestige of the 
Assembly and to reassure all sections of the population. This was 




























































































Despite this shaky beginning, the reforms have, nevertheless, 
been well under way and there are several indications that the new 
institutions will survive^arid even have a certain amount of 
success. First of all, the^/Assembly has been set up and those 
initially opposed to the Statut Particulier (the local 
politicians) have not sabotaged it. On the contrary, realizing 
that the nature of the "transmission belt" by which resources are 
channelled from the centre to periphery had irreversibly changed, 
their aim has been to capture the most important places in the new 
sytem. With the help of an intermediary group called the 
"intergroupe de sept" (56), they managed to secure the 
Presidencies of the important Offices, Furthermore, they voted, 
almost unanimously with the Left, in favour of the the budget 
priorities, at 5.30 a.m. on 25th February 1984 (57). These would 
form the basis of a contract negiotiated between the Assembly and 
the government. The later reversal of position of the Right helped 
by the "intergroupe de sept", which blocked the Assembly's 
functioning and provoked its dissolution by the government, may be 
interpreted as a tactical move rather than an attack on the in­
stitution itself . The Right-wing Opposition hoped in this way to 
strengthen its position and even to win a majority in a new elec­
tion (for an analysis of the August 1984 elections see below). But 
this in itself indicated an awareness that local politics must now 




























































































Socialists had created an irreversible process to which all 
Corsican politics had to adapt itself .
Secondly, despite the refusal of the FLNC to accept the new 
institutions, most of those alienated from the system have been 
drawn back into it. It is significant that Edmond Simeoni, one of 
the original founders of the ARC/UPC tendency, and three of the 
founders of the FRC, Charles Santoni, Dominique Alfonsi and Lucien 
Felli, all sat as Assembly members in the first Assembly. The 
withdrawal of the UPC from the Assembly on the 12th January 1984 
was explained by the party as a protest against the government's 
"abandonment" of the Assembly (58). This criticism, however,
implies an acceptance of the new institutions. The real motive
behind the withdrawal was more probably the fear that the UPC
would lose influence among Corsican youth, who suspected them of
having gone soft on the government and the "pouvoir"(59). It is 
more likely that they, too, wished to use the new elections to 
increase their representation in the Assembly. Furthermore, the 
FLNC has become increasingly marginal and is now perceived by most 
Corsicans either as a threat to their fundamental conviction that 
Corsica should remain French or as being undemocratic. Many 
Corsicans who had hitherto sympathized with the group became ill 
at ease with the xenophobic campaign against "continentaux" 
(Frenchmen from the mainland). This has been aimed mainly at 




























































































in the eyes of the FLNC, was that they bore French names. The tiny 
minority support of the FLNC was sarcastically emphasized by 
Mitterrand when he remarked: "...je ne connais pas de démocratie 
ou 1,6 per cent, ou plutôt moins, a pu faire la loi à 98,4 per 
cent" (60 ) .
Thirdly, the transfer of resources and personnel has taken 
place more or less as planned. There has been practically no 
resistance from within the Civil Service. The government was 
astute enough to choose Corsican Civil Servants who desired to 
reutrn to their home island to take charge of the different field 
services. Prefects who enthusiastically supported the 
decentralizion reforms were appointed. Thus an irreversible 
dynamic has been created which must ensure at least the survival 
and probably the success of the new institutions.
Finally, the Assembly has begun to act as a forum in which 
divisions and grievances on the part of the Corsican population 
may be expressed and fought out (61). If politics is war by 
another name, then it is possible that the endemic violence which 
has plagued Corsican society may be acted out in a symbolic manner 
within the Assembly.




























































































The tendencies outlined so far in this paper have been con­
firmed by the new elections, held in August 1984, which followed 
the dissolution of the first Assembly. As has been noted above, 
this dissolution was provoked by the Right in the hope of 
strengthening their position in the new Assembly rather than an 
attack on- the institutions as such. On the contrary, it was the 
confirmation of their acceptance of these institutions. The 
government wished to prevent a recurrence of the situation in the 
first Assembly when small groups were able to impose their will 
and create a situation of instablility. Accordingly, following a 
recommendation from the Senate, they increased the threshold 
necessary for a list to obtain a seat from 1.6 per cent to 5 per 
cent. This higher barrier had the effect of forcing groups to 
coalesce before the elections and not after them. Whereas in the 
1982 elections there were seventeen lists, in these elections this 
number was reduced to ten.
What is perhaps most significant about these elections from 
the point of view of our argument that the new institutions are an 
attempt to draw back into the political process those who had been 
alienated from it was the fact that the extreme nationalists of 
the FLNC/MCA tendency presented a list. Now not only the tradi­
tional Right-wing Opposition accepted and participated in the new 




























































































did not accept the institutions as the embodiment of their politi­
cal aspirations. On the contrary, they wished for a completely 
independent Corsica. Nevertheless, the institutions had become a 
central focus of the island's political life and the nationalists 
were forced to recognize this and try to influence their 
functioning. In fact, the nationalists' list obtained 3 seats with 
5.22 per cent of the votes cast by biting into the support of the 
UPC who dropped to 5.21 per cent. The latter suffered from the 
illness of their charismatic leader Edmond Simeoni but the 
principal reason for their loss of votes was indeed what they had 
feared: a significant portion of the nationalists voters, espe­
cially the young ones, who had given them their support withdrew 
it because of their alleged compromise with the Socialists. 
Nevertheless, the nationalists took their seats in the new 
Assembly and, furthermore, participated in its functioning.
The other notable feature of the 1984 elections was the 
success of the neo-Fascist Front National of Jean-Marie Le Pen in 
winning six seats. This frustrated the designs of the traditional 
Right (RPR and UDF) of winning a clear majority in the new 
Assembly and they were forced to form a coalition with the extreme 
Right in order to capture the Presidency and therefore the execu­
tive of the Assembly. What is interesting in this situation is 
that now, for the first time in Corsican history, all the politi­




























































































extreme Right were now represented in one Assembly. While the 
Right have used their position to try to frustrate the 
nationalists (for example in refusing to vote the credits to the 
local university accused of being a nationalist hotbed) at least 
there is now the possiblity that if the Left win power again, 
perhaps with the help of the autonomists or nationalists these 
positions can be reversed. In other words, the political conflicts 
of the island are now being fought out within the new 
institutions. Only time will tell whether this process will 
succeed in eradicating the violence.
Conclusion: prospects for the future
So far in this paper we have tended to take the most optimis­
tic view of the Statut Particulier and its potential for resolving 
the problème corse. This is because there are real grounds for 
such optimism and the signs so far point to the continuing sur­
vival of the institutions and the possibility that in the long 
term they will contribute to changing and modernizing political 
behaviour on the island. The Regional Assembly could be seen as 




























































































behave in a more principled manner than has been their custom. 
This may be achieved by the accountability forced on them by the 
fact that their performance is now subject to the sanction of the 
local population because of election by universal suffrage. 
Furthermore, the old clan system is in the process of breaking 
down as new political forces (such as the Left, the autonomists 
and nationalists, and some modernizing sections of the traditional 
Right) are given the possibility of exercizing power within the 
Region. At least, these are the possibilities that the new in­
stitutions open for the future.
Nevertheless, other commentators, such as Professor Yves 
Mény, have taken a less optimistic and even a cynical view with 
regard to the entire decentralization reforms seeing in them 
another example of plus ga change, plus c'est la même chose . 
While such authors are right to emphasize the continuity with 
previous decentralization programmes, they seem to underestimate 
the very real changes that have taken place, in particular the 
change which allows regional bodies to be elected by universal 
suffrage. The disappointment of authors such as Michel Crozier 
(63) may result from too short-sighted a view of the political 
process and while Crozier is right that "on ne change pas la 
société par decrét", the "content" (that is local politics) must 
change as the "context" (the new institutions) changes. This 




























































































Despite this, the critics are correct to point out certain 
failings of the reforms. For example, in the case of Corsica there 
is now an excess of institutions (64). Besides the Regional 
Assembly and its accompanying institutions, there remain the 
departmental instutions of the island's two départements. This has 
led to a certan amount of confusion and overlapping with regard to 
their functions and powers. In fact, this is an instance of what 
is perhaps the most serious ambiquity of the entire decentraliza­
tion reforms: the failure to make a clear choice between a 
decentralization based on the département or one based on the 
region, it being generally recognized that the two levels of local 
government are imcompatible.
This does not detract from the fact that the Statut 
Particulier does represent a courageous and far-sighted attempt 
(perhaps the first such attempt in Corsican history) to tackle the 
"problème corse" in a democratic manner. Paradoxically, the 
government has had to force the majority of the local population 
to accept the responsibility of running their own affairs. This is 
an interesting example of the Rousseauian problem of whether one 
can force people to be free. The success or failure of the reform 
depends, then, on two groups of actors: on the islanders them­
selves and on the government. The former must learn a new set of 
political habits. The latter have already gone a long way by 




























































































However, they must continue to provide financial, technical and 
political support until the island has developed sufficiently to 
provide largely for itself. This will never be totally possible 
but at least Corsicans might live in a more dignified manner than 
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1974)", in C. Gras et G. Livet (eds), Régions et 
régionalisme en France, (du XVIIIe siècle à nos lours). 
PUF, Pans, 1977 , pp 529-543.
On previous attempts to reform the French prefectoral 
system see Howard Machin, The Prefect in French Public 
Adminstration , London, 1977.
Loi no. 82-213 du 2 mars 1982 and loi no. 82-623 du 22 
juillet 1982, see Journal Officiel du 3 mars and 23 
juillet 1982.
See Michael Keating, "Decentralization in Mitterrand's 
France", Public Administration, (Journal of the Royal 
Institute of Public Administration), Vol 61, no 3, 
Autumn 1983, pp 237-251.
This question has a political dimension in as far as 
Corsican regionalists have the emphasized the difference 
of Corsica whiule French Jacobins (including Corsicans) 
stress the similarities between the island and the rest 
of France.
For a fuller treatment of the background see Paul 
Hainsworth and John Loughlin, "Le problème corse", in 
Contemporary French Civilization, Vol VIII, no 3, Spring 
1984.
In 1768, exhausted by forty years of revolts by 
Corsicans, Genoa ceded the exercise of sovereignty (but 
not de jure sovereignty) to France by the Treaty of 
Versailles. The French gained control of the island only 
in 1769 when they defeated the forces of the insurgent 
leader, Pascal Paoli, at the battle of Ponte Novu.
Savoy, for example, was attached to France only in 1860 





































































































Santu Casanovu (1850-1936). On the question of the 
Corsican language and its relationship to Italian and 
French, see F. Ettori, "Langue et littérature", in F. 
Pomponi et al., CORSE, Edit Bonneton, 1981, pp 169-211.
Corsican regionalists are, in general, reluctant to 
admit the Italian connection (see below) and claim that 
Corsican is a language in its own right. However, an 
Italian speaking Tuscan can easily communicate with a 
Corsican, whereas this is impossible for a Frenchman. 
The distinction between dialect and language seems to be 
valid on political and social grounds (as translating 
power relationships) rather than on purely linguistic 
ones.
This is an estimate made by the author.
See E. Perrier, Corse: les raisons de la colère, Paris, 
1971, "La Corse connût des années 1815 aux années 1870 
un développement économique complexe, contradictoire, 
mais incontestable", p 16.
See F Pomponi, "Crise de structure économique et crise 
de conscience en Corse (Fin XIXe siècle - début XXe)" in 
Typologie des crises dans les pays méditerranéens (XVIe- 
XXe siècles), Nice 1977, pp 76-113.
See À Casanova, "Evolution historique des sociétés et 
voies de la Corse. Essai d'approche", Cahiers d'histoire 
de l'Institut de recherches marxistes, no 12, 1983, pp 
36-65 .
Complete autarchy was, of course, impossible - there 
were also interactions of a cultural and economic 
nature. However, the tendency was to look inward towards 
one's own clan. The best anthropological work on 
Corsican village and family life is that of Georges 
Ravis-Giordani, see for example his "Ethnologie" (avec 
la collaboration de Rennie Pecqueux-Barboni) in F
Pomponi et al., op cit, (1981), pp 61-167.
For example, Charles Santoni, in "La crise de la 
conscience corse", Les Temps modernes, aôt-sept. 1978, 
p 226, describes the clan system, in its ancient form, 
as a "forme de démocratie presque parfaite".
Even the bandits in the maquis, the heroes of romantic 
writers, were not free - the superstitions which they 





































































































going around in odd numbers, which was regarded as 
courting bad luck.
There is a growing literature on the clans in Corsica. 
See, for example, Antoine Sanguinetti, "Le clan, la 
violence, et la fraude électorale", Les Temps Modernes, 
octobre, 1981.
Janine Renucci called it the "virus migrateur", see her 
Corse traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle, Lyon, 1974.
Estimates vary, see Renucci, op cit.
This is the term used by E Perrier, op cit, p 19.
See Pomponi, op cit, (1977).
This term was actually used, some years after Liberation 
during the Gaullist period, by a Prefect addressing the 
Conseil généeral of Corsica.
At this time only the Corsican Federation of the 
Communist Party had an overall plan for reversing the 
trend toward the island's economic and social demise, 
see their weekly newspaper, Terre Corse, 1943-. However, 
after an upsurge of support after the war, their 
expulsion from at the national level in 1947 made them 
less able to put their plan into effect
The position of the clans after World War II differed 
from their position after World War I since not only was 
the island's decline at a much more serious point, but 
they were also strongly challenged by the Communists who 
had captured about half of the island's votes in
elections and had one deputy out the four who
represented the island.
Regionalization is used here to denote governmental 
regional policy. Regionalism is taken to mean the
ideology and practice of political and social actors on 
the periphery who seek greater control over the
periphery's resources and over the manner in which 
national resources are channelled from the centre to the 
periphery. We have called the early regionalism of the 
Corsican elites protoregionalism because the term 
"regionalism" could not be used because of the political 
"ban" on the idea and on movements associated with it in 




































































































On the Corsican PAR, see Anne-Marie Guigue, Le programme 
d'action régionale et le problème corse, Nancy, 1965.
The name chosen indicates both the ideology and aims of 
the movement. It was on the 30th November, 1789 that the 
French National Assembly voted that Corsican should be 
fully integrated into the "French Empire". The name 
suggested that Corsican was still only on the eve of 
integration and demanded that it become a reality.
See his La révolution régionaliste, Paris, 1967, and 
Décoloniser en France, Paris, 1971.
Especially in their collective publication Main basse 
sur une île, Martineau, 1971, whose principal authors, 
it seems, were Charles Santoni and Pascal Marchetti.
In August 1976, Edmond Simeoni and an armed group of ARC 
(Action régionaliste corse) militants occupied the 
vineyard of a pied noir to protest against a scandal 
that, in their eyes, epitomized the "problème corse". A 
gun battle with police ensued and a policeman was 
killed. Another died later during gun battles in Bastia. 
ARC was banned and changed its name to the UPC (Unione 
di u Populu Corsu).
The author was on the island at the time of the 1981 
elections .
Proposition de loi, no. 1991, portant statut particulier 
pour la Corse, seconde session ordinaire de 1976-1977.
Loi no. 82-214 du 2 mars 1982 prtant statut particulier 
de la région de Corse (organisation administrative), JO 
du 3 mars 1982, pp 1-16. Louis Le Pensec, one of the 
sponsors of the 1977 bill, declared that "on ne peut pas 
faire le mine texte de loi quand on est dans
l'opposition et quand on est au gouvernement". Besides 
this, the jurists of the Conseil constitutionnel pointed 
out that the "pouvoir réglementaire régional" which the 
1977 bill would have given to the Regional Assembly 
belonged only to the government and was 
unconstitutional.
Loi no. 82-659 du 30 juillet 1982 portant statut 






























































































(37) "...la meilleure façon de représenter ce peuple corse 
..." (italics added), address to the Corsican Assembly, 
Ajaccio, 13th June 1983.
(38) "L'élection a lieu à la représentation proportionnelle, 
suivant le règle de la plus forte moyenne, sans 
adjonction ni suppression de nom et sans modification de 
l'ordre de présentation", art 5 of loi du 2 mars 1982. 
At first, it was decided that only 1.6 per cent of the 
votes cast was necessary for a list to obtain a seat.
(39) Art. 2 of loi du 2 mars 1982.
(40) Gaston Defferre, in an address to the Corsican Assembly 
on the 1st Décembre 1983, forcefully stressed the 
limitations of the Assembly's powers": "...ni la loi, ni 
son esprit, ne conduisent à faire que toutes les 
propositions de l'Assemblée de Corse soient 
obligatoirement réalisées par le Gouvernement... Le 
statut particulier, conformément à la constitution, ne 
donne pas le pouvoir à l'Assemblée de Corse d'édicter, 
directement ou indirectement, ses propres lois".
(41) Loi du 30 juillet 1982.
(42) Art. 20 of the loi du 30 juillet 1982.
(43) All from ibid.
(44) Ibid, arts. 23-27.
(45) See Machin op cit, for the importance of the 




See Mark Kesselman, "The end of Jacobinism?", 
Contemporary French Civilization, Vol VIII, no 2, 1983. 
"une commission de contrôle des opérations de vote de 
recensement", art. 23 du loi du 2 mars 1982. It was the
practice of Corsican mayors, including those of the two 
big towns (50,000 inhabitants) Bastia and Ajaccio, to 
"negotiate" with the INSEE, the numbers of inhabitants 
in their communes!
(48) For a fuller account of the 1982 elections see 
Hainsworth and Loughlin, op cit.
(49) Le Monde, 10th August 1982.
(50) Address to Assembly, 1st December 1983.
































































































This consists of the President and a number of vice- 
Presidents whose number may range from four to ten (art. 
32 of loi du 2 mars 1982), the number to be decided by 
the Assembly. It opted for the maximum number, ten.
There are five Commissions: (1) Finances, budget et
fiscalité; (2) Plan et interventions économiques, 
chargée du bilan et de la prospective; (3) 
Environnement, urbanisme, logement et affaires sociales; 
(4) Culture, education et formation; (5) Contrôle des 
agences et offices régionaux. The function of the 
Commissions is prepare the "décisions qui incombent (à 
l'Assemblée) et des affaires qui liu sont soumises", 
art. 12 of the Réglement intérieur of the Assemblée de 
Corse.
806 bombs exploded in 1982 and 591 in 1983. Furthermore, 
there was an increase in criminal activities such as 
armed robberies, protection rackets, etc., with the 
distinction between the FLNC and the Corsican underworld 








This was formed by two Assembly members who left the 
UPC, Felli and Ferrandi, the two radical regionalist 
independents, Santoni and Dominique Alfonsi, and three 
whose political orientation was towards the traditional 
Right.
Provoking the cry from Charles Santoni: "E la nave va", 
La Corse-Le Provençal, 25th February 1984.
La Corse-Le Provençal,13th February 1984.
Interview with ex-UPC Assembly member.
Address to Corsican Assembly, 13th June 1983.
Inhabitants of the mountain village of Bastelica 
decsended to the Assembly— at Ajaccio to discuss a 
conflict about funding for a cross-country ski station, 
La Corse-Le Provençal, 22nd October 1983; the question 
of the financial collapse of the Maison de la Culture de 
la Corse was taken up by the Assembly; violent incidents 
during which CRS police attacked striking workers in 




























































































(62) For a fuller analysis, see John Loughlin, "The Elections 
to the Corsican Regional Assembly, August 1984", 
Government and Opposition, voi 20, no. 2, Sprinq 1985, 
pp 240-250.
(63) For example, Crozier’s comment in the preface to the 
1984 edition of La société bloquée, that nothing had 
changed since the arrival of the Socialists to power.
(64) See Yves Mény and John Loughlin, "La Corsica tra rivolta
e riforma: il problema corso e la politica del governo
di F Mitterrand", in Le regioni, a. XII, no 3, maggio- 
giugno 1984, pp 483-504.
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